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This paper provides new evidence on the impacts of trade reforms on wages and wage inequality 
in developing countries. While most of the vast current literature on the topic achieves 
identification by comparing outcomes before and after one episode of trade liberalization across 
industries, we propose a stronger identifying strategy. We explore the recent historical record of 
policy changes adopted by Argentina: from significant protection in the early 1970s, to the first 
episode of liberalization during the late 1970s, back to a slowdown of reforms during the 1980s, 
to the second episode of liberalization in the 1990s. These swings in trade policy comprise broken 
trends in trade reforms that we can compare with observed trends in wages and wage inequality. 
After setting up unusual historical data sets of trends in tariffs, trends in wages, and trends in 
wage inequality, our evidence supports two well-known hypotheses: trade liberalization, ceteris 
paribus, i) has reduced wages and ii) has increased wage inequality. 
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There is a vast literature that studies the impacts of trade liberalization on wages and wage
inequality. In Latin America, the focus of many of these papers, most of the evidence
indicates that tariﬀ liberalization has increased the disparity in labor earnings between
skilled and unskilled workers. One mechanism is through the wage premia generated by
tariﬀs in protected sectors. If protection is granted in those sectors that use unskilled labor
more intensively, trade liberalization can cause relative unskilled wages to decline and wage
inequality to increase. Important papers are Currie and Harrison (1997), Feliciano (2001),
Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005b), Harrison and Hanson (1999),
Revenga (1997), and Robertson (2004). Other mechanisms are skilled biased technical change
induced by openness and skill complementarity of capital goods or imported materials. See
Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005a), and Pavcnik (2003).
While the diﬀerent papers in the literature use diﬀerent techniques, identiﬁcation
generally follows from one episode of trade liberalization: outcomes, usually the wages of
skilled and unskilled workers, are compared before and after a trade reform and across
diﬀerent industries so that the identifying variation hinges on the diﬀerential rate of tariﬀ
reform across sectors. Arguably, however, the estimated impacts may confound unobserved
eﬀe c t sa n du n a c c o u n t e ds i m u l t a n e o u sp o l i c yr e f o r m s . T h i si sam a j o rc o n c e r ni nL a t i n
America during the 1990s, a period when most countries implemented several concurrent
reforms.
In this paper, we pursue a stronger identiﬁcation strategy by exploring the recent
historical record of trade policy changes adopted by Argentina during the last 30 years:
from high protection in the early 1970s, to a signiﬁcant liberalization of trade in the late
1970s and early 1980s, to a stagnation of tariﬀs in the 1980s, to the full liberalization of
the 1990s, and to Mercosur.1 These swings in trade policy generate broken trends in tariﬀ
reforms that we can compare with observedt r e n d si nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y . O u ri d e n t i ﬁcation
strategy thus explores a potential match between the trends in trade liberalization and the
1Mercosur, enacted in the early 1990s, is a regional trade agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay.
2trends in wage inequality.
To develop our strategy, we set up unusual historical data sets of trends in trade reforms,
trends in wages, and trends in wage inequality in Argentina. The data span the period
1974-2001. We construct a time series of tariﬀs, for diﬀerent sectors in diﬀerent years, and
a time series of labor force surveys with data on individual wages. This is the ﬁrst instance
in this literature in which such a historical record of trade reforms is put together with a
historical micro data set of workers and wages.2 The outcome is almost 30 years of data
on sectoral tariﬀs and individual wages that, we believe, provide a diﬀerent, useful, and
compelling identiﬁcation strategy.
In addition to exploring the overall match between trends in tariﬀ reforms and trends in
wage inequality, we use these data to compare the two liberalization episodes of the 1970s
and 1990s and to examine some key diﬀerences between them. This is a contribution to the
literature on trade liberalization in Latin America, which has focused almost entirely on the
1990s. However, in Argentina, both the increase in wage inequality and the trade reforms
were much more marked in the 1970s than in the 1990s. The skill premium, for instance,
doubled in the 1970s but increased by 42 percent in the 1990s. In addition, the average
tariﬀ reduction of the 1970s was of nearly 70 percentage points (from 100 to 30 percent) but
was of 12 percentage points (from 30 to 18 percent) during the 1990s. Further, the share
of wage earnings in GDP declined from 45 percent to 30 percent during the 1970s (to the
beneﬁt of the capital share), and it remained below 40 percent afterwards. It seems that an
analysis based solely on data spanning the 1990s may miss important links between tariﬀs
and wages. Here, we ﬁll this gap by pursuing a historical investigation of these episodes of
tariﬀ reforms.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that trade reforms, ceteris paribus,h a v ei )d e c r e a s e dw a g e s
and ii) increased wage inequality in Argentina. After controlling for individual worker
characteristics, survey eﬀects, industry eﬀects, and time-varying skill premium eﬀects (like
labor regulation and unionization or school quality) we ﬁnd a strong positive association
2The work by Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) and Golberg and Pavcnik (2005a) is similar to
ours in that it exploits data from the eighties and the nineties. There is a major diﬀerence, though. Whereas
their study involves one trade reform, we study two episodes of trade liberalization separated by a reversal
to protection.
3between tariﬀs and average wages, and a strong negative association between tariﬀsa n dt h e
skill premium. Following a tariﬀ reduction of 10 percent, for instance, the wage of an average
unskilled worker would decline by 3.9 percent while the wage of an average skilled worker
would decline by only 0.5 percent. This suggests that while average wages would decline,
the skill premium would instead increase by 3.4 percent.
Our results suggest that tariﬀ liberalization can help explain the decline in wages and the
increase in wage inequality observed in Argentina both during the 1970s and the 1990s. There
are important diﬀerences, however. The large tariﬀ cuts of the 1970s can account for over
one fourth of the 100 percent increase in wage inequality (i.e., concretely, for 27 percentage
points). During the 1990s, instead, tariﬀ reforms can only account for 10 percent of the
observed increase in wage inequality. This implies that other concurrent factors, such as
other policy reforms inherent to the 1990s (technological change, deregulation, privatization),
also played a key role in the determination of the wages of Argentine workers during the last
decade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data
used in this paper and we motivate our work by describing the trends in trade liberalization
and the trends in wage inequality. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and Section 4
concludes.
2T h e T r e n d s i n T a r i ﬀ Reforms and Wage Inequality
A major input into our analysis is the historical data on Argentine trade policy and wages,
spanning the 1974-2001 period. These data come from two diﬀerent sources: customs data
on imports and tariﬀs, and household survey data on wages and workers.
We begin by describing the customs data. We measure trade policies with sectoral tariﬀs.
Data on ad-valorem import tariﬀsc o m ef r o mo ﬃcial Tariﬀ Schedules, which specify the tariﬀ
rate levied on each item of the Harmonized System (HS). In order to make our trade data
comparable with the wage data, we need to build tariﬀ measures at the 3-digit level of
the ISIC classiﬁc a t i o n .T od ot h i s ,w eﬁrst match each heading in the Harmonized System
4with its closest equivalent in the ISIC classiﬁcation. We then aggregate the HS data to
build measures of tariﬀs at the 3-digit level. To perform the aggregate, we start from the
next-to-lowest subheading, calculate the median of the item belonging to it, and iterate on
this procedure.3 W ee n du pw i t hap a n e ld a t as e to fi m p o r tt a r i ﬀsf o rt h em a n u f a c t u r i n g
sector across time.
Figure 1 provides some insights into the nature of trade policy and trade reform in
diﬀerent years. It depicts key percentiles of the distribution of import tariﬀs.
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excludes outside values
Note: Distribution of median tariﬀ within each 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sector for
selected years. The ends of the boxes are the 1st and 3rd quartiles, while the line within the
b o x e sc o r r e s p o n d st ot h em e d i a n .T h ee n d so ft h eb a r ss h o wt h ep o i n t sw h i c ha r ef u r t h e s t
away from the ends of the box, but at a distance not larger than 3/2 the interquartile
range. We do not show outside values (points which are even further away). The quantiles
are calculated weighting each sector by its employment level.
The recent historical Argentine trade policy is characterized by at least three diﬀerent
periods. Our starting point in 1974 was one of high protection, with average tariﬀsi n
excess of 100 percent, and sectors with median tariﬀs in excess of 200 percent. Starting in
1976, tariﬀs were abruptly reduced. The average tariﬀ was cut by two thirds in three years,
dropping from slightly above 100 percent in 1976, to 47 percent in 1978 and to 32 percent
3See the Data Appendix for further details on sources of information, the matching of Harmonized System
and ISIC classiﬁcation, and the aggregation procedure.
5in 1979. In addition, the whole distribution shifted downwards with respect to 1974. There
was also a further reduction in tariﬀsa so f1 9 8 2 .
The trend in trade reforms is broken in 1982; there was a slight increase in average tariﬀs
starting in 1982 and continuing all throughout the eighties. In contrast, tariﬀs were reduced
again in 1990 and 1991, remaining below 20% throughout the decade. In 1994, Mercosur
was adopted and tariﬀs were further reduced. However, in an attempt to prevent the ﬁscal
crisis, there was a slight increase in tariﬀs in 2001.4
We turn now to the labor force data. The standard source of individual data on labor
earnings and worker characteristics in Argentina is the Permanent Household Survey (EPH,
Encuesta Permanent de Hogares). This is a typical labor force survey with information on
wages, employment status, and individual and family characteristics (age, gender, family
size, etc.). The data are usually collected twice a year, in May and October. The labor force
surveys EPHs of the 1990s have been already used in the literature but, for our purposes, we
needed to track the surveys back into the 1970s and 1980s. We were able to compile 40 EPH
surveys. Table A3 in the appendix provides a brief description of the diﬀerent data sets used
here and their sample sizes. We have data for all years, except for 1979, 1983, and 1984.
For years 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1992, we only have information for
October (and thus not for May). In contrast, in 1980 and 1982, we use data on May but not
on October.
To compute the skilled wage premium, we deﬁne at this stage three educational categories:
skilled labor, which comprises workers who have ﬁnished college, semiskilled labor, which
comprises workers who have ﬁnished secondary school (and may have incomplete college
education), and unskilled labor, which comprises workers with no schooling, complete and
incomplete primary education, and incomplete secondary education. The skill premium is
calculated as the coeﬃcient on the skilled dummy in a standard wage regression. Concretely,
4Trade policy is not limited to tariﬀs but includes non-tariﬀ barriers like quotas, or quantitative
restrictions. Unfortunately, we were unable to construct adequate measures of non-tariﬀ barriers for the
period under analysis. However, the historical accounts on the use of quotas in Argentina reveal that
they were eliminated around 1959 and were not active until after 1982. Quantitative Restrictions were
maintained during the eighties and were fully eliminated at the end of the 1980s as a pre-requisite to
Mercosur negotiations. For more details, see Berlinski (1994) and Berlinski (2003).
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Note: own calculation based on historical trade data and labor surveys (EPH). Tariﬀ:
average tariﬀ across all 3-digit ISIC sectors, weighted by employment in each sector. Skilled
wage premium: coeﬃcients on the skilled dummy in diﬀerent earnings regressions per year.
we ran separate regressions of wages on the skill dummy for one survey in each year,
controlling for age, age squared, gender and marital status. Notice that we do not include
trade related variables at this point.
Figure 2 reveals the breaks in trade liberalization trends and the breaks in the wage
inequality trends that we exploit in this paper. The broken line corresponds to the evolution
of the average tariﬀ during the period 1974-2001. The ﬁgure clearly shows the initial high
protection on the early 1970s, the liberalization of the late 1970s, the stagnation of tariﬀs
during the 1980s, and the last episode of liberalization of the 1990s.
The solid line in Figure 2 depicts the skill premium.5 There is a sharp increase in
the diﬀerential between wages of skilled and unskilled individuals between 1974 and 1982,
coinciding with the ﬁrst wave of trade policy reforms. While individuals with college
education earned roughly 60% more than their unskilled counterparts in 1974, the diﬀerence
grew to about 120% in 1982. Between 1982 and 1989, when trade liberalization lost
momentum, the skill premium decreased markedly. In contrast, the skill premium resumed
5Note that we report the estimated coeﬃcient directly —i.e., without the standard exponential
transformation (ecoefficient − 1).
7its upward course during the 1990s, coinciding with the second episode of trade liberalization.
Overall, there seems to be a correlation between tariﬀ levels and the skill premium. We turn
next to an econometric assessment of this relationship.
3 The Impacts of Trade
We begin with a simple econometric model in which sectoral tariﬀsa ﬀect industry wages.
This would be consistent with a model of interindustry wage premiums (Dickens and
Katz, 1986, and Krueger and Summers, 1989) whereby wage premia are attributable to
compensating diﬀerentials, speciﬁc human capital, or more generally, to unobserved worker
attributes that may be systematically correlated with industry aﬃliation. In our model, this
wage premia depend on industry tariﬀs.
We regress the log of the wage of individual i, in industry j,a tt i m et,( lnwijt), on the log
of the tariﬀ in industry j at time t, lnτtjt, an indicator of skill level dSigjt (where g indicates
whether the worker is classiﬁed as skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled), and a number of other
individual characteristics (xijt) such as age, gender, and marital status. The model is





δgtdSigjt + αlnτjt + Ij + Yt + µijt,
where Ij is an industry ﬁxed eﬀect, Yt is a survey-period eﬀect, and µijt is the error term.
As explained in section 2, we use data on sectoral tariﬀs at the 3-digit level.
We report ﬁndings from four diﬀerent econometric models. In Model 1, the returns to
schooling (δg) and tenure are constant across time; in Model 2, the returns to schooling are
a l l o w e dt ov a r yf r o ms u r v e yt os u r v e y( δgt), but the returns to age are not time-varying;
in Model 3, both the returns to schooling and the returns to age vary across surveys. In
Model (4), we further allow for a sectoral linear trend in the model to control for possible
trends in the change in wages that might be a confounding factor for the impacts of tariﬀs.
A nice feature of our study is that the two episodes of trade liberalization that we exploit to
identify the eﬀect of tariﬀs on wages are separated in time by approximately a whole decade.
8This gives us enough variability to disentangle, by exploiting the within sector variability
in tariﬀs, the eﬀect of trade liberalization on wages from other concurrent secular trends in
wages at the industry level.
In all our speciﬁcations, we include survey eﬀects and industry dummies. This
controls for changes in exchange rates (devaluations and appreciations) and industry-speciﬁc
characteristics so that the impacts of tariﬀs are not confounded by industry characteristics
or by aggregate shocks (related to policy or business cycle). These ﬁxed eﬀects help control
for unobservable eﬀects that would produce a spurious correlation between tariﬀs and wages.
Since our tariﬀ measures vary across industries, any clustering in the residuals µijt in (1)
may be exacerbated (Moulton, 1989; Kloek, 1981). In all our regressions, thus, inference
is made on the basis of a robust, cluster-corrected estimation of the variance of the error
term. In all our results, we report two estimates of the standard errors. In one model, we
allow for clustering at the industry level to account for autocorrelation in the residuals at
the industry level (that is, for shocks to the industry that may perpetuate in time). In the
second model, the errors are clustered at the time-industry level.6 Our results are robust to
these two models of cluster eﬀects.
The main results from model (1) —where we include sectoral tariﬀs as regressors, without
interactions with the skilled dummies— are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) to (4) correspond
to Models 1 to 4, respectively; the standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported
within parenthesis and those clustered by industry and time, within brackets. We ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of tariﬀs on wages, a relationship that is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
These results are not aﬀected by allowing the returns to schooling to vary from survey to
survey (time-varying returns to schooling in column 2) and by allowing both the returns to
schooling and age to be time-varying (column 3). Further, the results remain practically
unaltered if we also include sector-speciﬁc linear trends in the model (columns 4).
Our ﬁndings support the view that, ceteris paribus, trade barriers protect workers
earnings across the board.7 Although these ﬁn d i n g sa r em o r eo rl e s se x p e c t e d ,t h ep r e v i o u s
6This is the standard clustering analyzed in Moulton (1989) and Kloek (1981).
7Since the model condition on parametric and non-parametric time trends, the correct interpretation of
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of trade liberalization on wages is conditional of any growth eﬀect of that trade reform.
9literature is sometimes inconclusive. In Argentina, for instance, Galiani and Sanguinetti
(2003) do not ﬁnd a positive association between tariﬀs and wages (though they do ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant association with import penetration measures). Currie and Harrison (1997) and
Harrison and Hanson (1999) are other examples where tariﬀs show up insigniﬁcant in wage
regressions. In Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004), on the other hand, tariﬀsh a v ea
signiﬁcant impact on the industry premia and overall wages, and in Revenga (1997), real
wages are also found to be aﬀected by tariﬀs.8
This ﬁnding helps to explain part of the decline in the labor share of GDP that took
place in Argentina during the late 1970s. Galiani and Gerchunoﬀ (2003) report that, after
the liberalization of the late 1970s, the share of labor income on GDP dropped from 45
percent to around 30 percent. Moreover, they show that this share never recovered to the
historical levels observed up to the pre-seventies. The tariﬀ elasticities reported in column
(3) of Table 1, for instance, suggest that a one percent increase in the average tariﬀ can
cause average wages to increase by roughly 0.35 percent. These estimates imply that the
liberalization of the 1970s, when tariﬀs were reduced by 70 percentage points, could have
reduced wages by 24.5 percent, a decline that can account for an important fraction of the
o b s e r v e dd r o pi nt h el a b o rs h a r e .
3.1 Tariﬀ Reforms and the Skill Premium
In this section, we examine an empirical model where tariﬀ reforms can have an impact of
the skill premium. We estimate the following model:





δgtdSigjt + αlnτjt +
X
g
φgdSigjt lnτjt + Ij + Yt + µijt,
This model diﬀers from (1) in that we add interaction terms between the trade policy variable
(the log of tariﬀs, lnτ) and the educational attainment dummies (dSigjt). The coeﬃcients of
these interactions, φg, can be interpreted as the diﬀerential impact of trade on the wage of
8The literature on this topic is very rich. Our review of the evidence is necessarily short, to avoid
distracting attention from the main results of our paper. There are very good surveys on the trade-wages
link, including Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005b) and Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004).
10individuals with diﬀerent education, over and above the average eﬀect of trade protection.9
Equation (2) is consistent with a model of skill premium at the industry level as in
Lovely and Richardson (2000). Consider an economy in which each ﬁrm takes the outside
wage as given, but pays a premium to compensate workers for ﬁrm-speciﬁc skill acquisition
or from the disutility from higher eﬀort associated with employment in the industry. Firms
are assumed to face distinct labor markets, one for each type of labor (unskilled, semi-skilled
and skilled). A ﬁrm in a particular industry faces an upward-sloping supply curve for labor
of each type. The elasticity of these labor supply curves is decreasing in the degree of ﬁrm-
or industry-speciﬁcc o n t e n to fh u m a nc a p i t a l .I na d d i t i o n ,t h ed e m a n dc u r v ef o re a c ht y p e
of labor in a given industry is downward sloping.
Changes in trade protection arise outside the industry, from fundamental shocks like
trade liberalization, and are uncorrelated with shocks to industry labor-supply curves. In
particular, it may be the case that an increase in foreign competition in an industry aﬀects
unskilled workers relatively more than skilled. It may also occur that skilled workers possess
less (relative) industry speciﬁc human capital, or more generally, their supply curve to an
industry is more elastic than the supply curves of low-skilled workers. In both cases, which
may hold true together, a shift in labor demand as a result of the trade liberalization and
increased foreign competition would likely increase the premium paid to skilled workers.
This is the model that we estimate next.
Our key ﬁndings are reported in Table 2. We estimate the four models described above
and the two standard errors, clustered by industry (within parenthesis) and clustered by
industry-time (within brackets). In the ﬁr s tr o wo ft h et a b l e ,w es h o wt h ed i r e c ti m p a c to f
tariﬀs on average wages. We ﬁnd evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of tariﬀso nt h e
wages of unskilled labor (at the 10 percent level). The magnitudes of the coeﬃcient range
from 0.355 to 0.447.
The second and third rows report the coeﬃcients that show the impacts of tariﬀ reforms
on the skilled wage premium. Interestingly, we ﬁnd no evidence of any impact of trade
9We also experimented with interactions of tariﬀs and age to explore the links between trade protection
and tenure. We did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant association between trade policy and returns to age.
See below.
11protection on skilled wage premiums in the model that assumes common returns to schooling
and tenure across time periods (column 1). In principle, however, we should expect the
skill premium to be aﬀected across time by many factors other than trade policy (such as
sectoral capital-skill complementarity, skill biased technical change or changes in sectoral
labor regulations). In column (2), thus, we allow the returns to schooling to vary from
survey to survey for reasons diﬀerent from trade liberalization. In column (3), we further
allow the returns to tenure to vary from survey to survey. In all these models, we ﬁnd that
trade protection aﬀected negatively and signiﬁcantly the returns to higher education. These
results are robust (and remain practically unchanged) to the inclusion of sector speciﬁcl i n e a r
trends (see column (4)).
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the intuition uncovered by Figure 2: after controlling for key
confounding factors, reductions in average tariﬀs lead to increases in the skilled wage
premium and to increases in wage inequality. These regression results appear very robust.
They are not an artifact of the business cycle or spurious trends since we control for survey
eﬀects. These survey eﬀects also control for inﬂation. They are not being confounded by
industry characteristics due to the inclusion of industry dummies nor by industry speciﬁc
trends. They are not the result of concurrent confounding policy factors, like labor reforms
or industrial policies, since individual characteristics and time varying returns to age and
education help control for them. Overall, thus, the results do not seem to be driven by
unobservables.
Before turning to a sensitivity analysis of our ﬁndings, we provide next a quantiﬁcation
of the impacts of the two trade liberalization episodes underwent by Argentina. To do this,
we mostly use the elasticities reported in column (3) of Table 2. The direct eﬀect of the
tariﬀ of the wages of unskilled workers is 0.389, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level. Whereas the interaction with the semiskilled dummy is not signiﬁcant, the
coeﬃcient of the interaction with the skilled dummy is negative (−0.339)a n ds i g n i ﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. Following a 10 percent decline in tariﬀs across sectors, these elasticities
imply a reduction in the wages of unskilled and semiskilled workers of roughly 3.89 percent
but a decline in the wages of skilled workers of only 0.5 percent.
12During the liberalization of the 1970s, the average tariﬀ was reduced by roughly 70
percentage points (from 100 percent to 30 percent). This implies a decline in the wages of
unskilled/semiskilled workers of 27.2 percent and a decline of the wages of the skilled workers
of only 3.5 percent. The skill premium thus rose by 23.7 percent due to this trade reform.
Since during this period the observed skill premium increased by 100 percent (the coeﬃcient
of the skill dummy was 0.62 in 1974 and 1.2 in 1982), we conclude that tariﬀ liberalization
can account for about one fourth of the observed change in wage inequality.
During the liberalization of the 1990s, the average tariﬀ was reduced from 30 percent to
18 percent, a decline of 12 percentage points. Conditional on everything else that happened
at the time, this tariﬀ reform caused a decline in the wages of unskilled/semiskilled workers
of 4.7 percent, a decline in the wages of skilled workers of 0.6 percent, and an increase in
the skilled premium of 4.1 percent. The skill premium increased from 0.7 in the early 1990s
to 1.0 in 2000, an increase of roughly 42 percent. It follows that the second episode of trade
liberalization can only account for a 10 percent o ft h eo b s e r v e di n c r e a s ei nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y .
We turn now to a sensitivity analysis. In Table 3, we reproduce the analysis of Table
2 but with a new deﬁnition of skills. Here, we classiﬁed as skill labor all workers with
either a college degree or a complete secondary school degree. Unskilled workers comprise
all individuals with incomplete secondary or lower education. Our ﬁndings are robust to this
new deﬁnition of skills. Tariﬀs have a direct positive impact on unskilled wages (signiﬁcant
only at the 10 percent level) and a negative impact of the skill premium (signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level).
There are two further concerns about the results in Table 2 that we need to address. One
concern is that the association of tariﬀs with the skill premium in the historical data may
be driven by the sharp drop in tariﬀs during the 1970s. Indeed, as pointed out before, the
tariﬀ cuts of the 1970s are approximately 5 times larger than the cuts of the liberalization
of the 1990s. To rule out this possibility, we experimented by breaking down the historical
series and dropping the 1970s from the analysis.
Our main results are reported in Table 4. The ﬁrst column reproduces column (3) of
Table 2, the model for 1974-2001 with three educational categories and time-varying returns
13to schooling and age. In column (2), we exclude the 1970s from the analysis. Our main
ﬁndings are unaﬀected by this change in the sample period. Tariﬀs are shown to have positive
eﬀects on average wages and negative and more signiﬁcant eﬀects on the skill premium. In
fact, the impacts on the skill premium are even larger when the 1970s are excluded, strongly
suggesting that our results are not driven by the tariﬀsc u t so ft h i sp e r i o d .I nc o l u m n( 3 ) ,
we exclude all years in the 1974-1982 period, where the tariﬀ cuts were largest (Figure 2).
Once again, our ﬁndings are robust to the exclusion of these years.
The second concern is the role of non-tariﬀ b a r r i e r sl i k eq u o t a so rq u a n t i t a t i v er e s t r i c t i o n s .
These are usual instruments of the Argentine trade policy, and provided non-tariﬀ barriers
a r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t ht a r i ﬀ barriers, their omission in the regressions can cast doubts on the
interpretation of our key results. The problem with non-tariﬀ barriers is that we were
unable to construct historical series spanning the period under study. Even simple measures
of coverage ratios are unavailable (or very hard to construct).10
In principle, if non-tariﬀ barriers were uncorrelated with tariﬀs, our estimates would
be consistent. However, this correlation is likely to be present, for instance if quotas are
high in those industries with low tariﬀs. Nevertheless, using data on tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ
ad-valorem equivalents compiled by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2005), we found that the
correlation between tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers in Argentina was positive but very small
(around 0.03). This suggests that the omission of non-tariﬀ barriers in the main regressions
would not be a severe problem.
We follow two further strategies to account for the role played by non-tariﬀ barriers. One
way around the problem of lack of data on NTBs is to exploit the sequencing of trade reforms
experienced by Argentina. Berlinski (1994; 2003) has documented that non-tariﬀ barriers
were mostly used during the debt crisis of 1982-1989. Before that, non-tariﬀ b a r r i e r sw e r en o t
generally used; after that, they were eliminated prior to the tariﬀ cuts of the liberalization
of the 1990s. This suggests a way to check the robustness of our results by further breaking
down the historical series. In column (4) of Table 4, for instance, we exclude the 1982-1989
10The historical trade data that we put together in this paper does not come electronically. Instead, we had
to collect hard copies of trade data for thousands of HS items for many years and to input them manually.
Non-tariﬀ barriers are usually implemented through legislative decrees speciﬁc to the diﬀerent industries.
Building a historical dataset of norms legislated by decrees is practically unfeasible.
14period from the analysis. We ﬁnd that the impacts of tariﬀs on average wages are positive,
similar in magnitude, but not statistically signiﬁcant; in contrast, the impacts of tariﬀso n
the skill premium remain negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Non-tariﬀ barriers were fully eliminated from 1988 to 1991. Indeed, the elimination
of quantitative restrictions was a pre-requisite to the negotiations of the common external
tariﬀ of Mercosur (Berlinski, 1994; 2003). Thus, an additional robustness check of the link
between tariﬀs and the skill premium is to run the model on the 1992-2001 sample. Active
trade policy during this period comprises only tariﬀ changes. Results in column (5) conﬁrm
our previous ﬁndings. Tariﬀs have a positive impact on average wages; this eﬀect is highly
signiﬁcant during the 1990s. Further, tariﬀs impact negatively, and highly signiﬁcantly, on
the skill premium.
A ﬁnal concern with the analysis is the potential endogeneity of sectoral tariﬀst ow a g e s
(as in a model of political economy or unionization). In our setting, the case for the
endogeneity of tariﬀs is relatively weak because our regressions include a number of control
variables that ameliorate this problem, namely time-varying returns to schooling and tenure,
individual characteristics, industry eﬀect, time eﬀects, and sectoral trends. The temporal
variation in our data is critical to support this claim. For instance, the endogeneity of tariﬀs
caused by sectoral unionization, industry lobbies, or political economy is unavoidable in a
cross-section but can be accounted for, to a large extent, with the industry dummies, the
time dummies, and the sectoral trends in the pooled historical data. Once we control for all
these variables, the level of protection is mostly determined by two factors: the worldwide
trend towards trade liberalization and the initial level of protection (so that sectors with
higher tariﬀs would face larger tariﬀ cuts, on average).11 We argue that these two factors
can reasonably be thought of as exogenous to the level of current wages in our econometric
models. Moreover, we claim that pursuing an instrumental variable approach would be
necessarily weak given the impossibility of ﬁnding reasonable instruments due to the nature
of our empirical exercise (which spans thirty years of Argentine recent history). Instead, we
exploit here the comparison of the breaks in the trends in tariﬀ r e f o r m sa n dt h eb r e a k si n
11See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005a)
15the trends in wage inequality (which are arguably exogenous). We believe that our strategy
of matching sectoral tariﬀs to sectoral wages through two episodes or trade liberalization
and one episode of reversal to protection provides a good and valid identiﬁcation strategy of
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on wages and wage inequality.
To end, we use our data to ask whether trade liberalization has had an eﬀect on the wages
of young (versus more tenured) workers. This is an interesting question for it may indicate
an additional channel by which trade can aﬀect income inequality and poverty. Our ﬁndings
reveal, however, that there is no evidence that trade protection has aﬀected the experience
premium; indeed, the coeﬃcients of the interactions of trade with age (and age squared) are
statistically insigniﬁcant. In the end, we conclude that trade has had an impact of the skill
premium but not on the tenure premium.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper proposed to explore the links between trade liberalization and skill premium by
exploring a historical dataset of Argentine trade policy and labor force surveys. To this end,
we put together information spanning almost 30 years of recent Argentine history, from 1974
to 2001. This is thus one of the few cases where such a data set is constructed. A similar
case is Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004), who carry out an analysis covering the
1984-1998 period in Colombia. But while they explore one episode of trade liberalization
(using 8 labor force surveys from 1984 to 1998), we exploit two episodes of trade reforms
separated by a decade of reversion to protection (using 40 surveys from 1974 to 2001).
The 1974-2001 period under study is one of active and ﬂuctuating trade reforms and
wage inequality in Argentina. Tariﬀ reforms accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
stagnated during the 1980s, and picked up further momentum during the 1990s. The skill
premium, in contrast, increased during the 1970s, declined during the 1980s, and increased
again during the 1990s. In addition, the share of labor income in GDP sharply dropped in
t h el a t e1 9 7 0 s ,a n dn e v e rr e c o v e r e d .
We use these historical trends in tariﬀ liberalization, in wages and in wage inequality
16to build a better and compelling identiﬁcation of the impacts of trade policy on the skill
premium. Overall, we ﬁnd that tariﬀ liberalization has hurt all workers but has caused an
increase in the skill premium. In particular, we ﬁnd that the large tariﬀ cuts of the 1970s
—of nearly 70 percentage points— can explain up to one-fourth of the observed increase in
wage inequality (which doubled from 1974 to 1982). Instead, the liberalization of the 1990s
—of roughly 12 percentage points— can only explain 10 percent of the increase in the skill
premium (of 42 percent). This indicates that tariﬀ reforms have contributed to the observed
increase in wage inequality but that there are other concurrent factors, particularly during
the reforms of the 1990s, that played a signiﬁcant role too.
Data Appendix
In this Appendix we document the construction of the tariﬀ measures used in the paper and
we brieﬂy describe the household surveys.
Import Tariﬀs
Our goal was to construct a measure of ad-valorem import tariﬀs in place in Argentina in
each year during the 1974—2001 period. The source for the raw data is the Guía Práctica
del Exportador e Importador, a monthly publication that provides current tariﬀsa tt h e
most disaggregated level of the National Import Tariﬀ Classiﬁcation (NADI). Table A1
describes the tariﬀ deﬁnition used for diﬀerent periods. Notice that these diﬀerent periods
are characterized by diﬀerent institutional arrangements (like the adoption of Mercosur in
the 1990s) and diﬀerent trade related policies. For each year, we use the tariﬀsi np l a c ei n
the middle of the year.
We needed to match the tariﬀ information from the customs sources (the Guía Práctica)
with the industry data from the household survey, which is based on the ISIC industry
classiﬁcation. From 1974 to 1991, the Argentine Statistical Institute used the ISIC Revision
2, and moved to the Revision 3 afterwards. Hence, we matched each category in the NADI
with its closest equivalent in the ISIC classiﬁcation used in diﬀerent period. Since the
17Table A1
Tariﬀ Deﬁnition
Time Period Tariﬀ Deﬁnition
1974-1991 Tariﬀ + Statistics rate (1)
Extra-MERCOSUR tariﬀ +
Statistics rate +
ad-valorem equivalent of DIEM (2) +
1992-2001
Convergence factor (in 2001) (3)
Notes: (1) The Statistics rate is an additional ad-valorem levy which
the government adds to certain goods. Its purpose is to ﬁnance the
collection of statistical data. It was originally instituted by Executive
Decree 6123/61.
(2) DIEM (Derechos de Importación Mínimos Especíﬁcos, minimum
speciﬁc import taxes) originated as anti-dumping measures for certain
import categories (including textiles). An “average import price” was
calculated for each category, and the corresponding tariﬀ was applied
to each price. The actual tariﬀ paid was the higher of this “minimum
import levy” and the ad-valorem tariﬀ applied to the actual price.
(3) The convergence factor was established by law in June 2001. It was
calculated as cf =1− 1+e
2 ,w h e r ee is the dollar price of 1 Euro.
ISIC classiﬁcation is coarser, we constructed an aggregate indicator for NADI categories
corresponding to a single ISIC code. This resulted in two series - one for 1974-1991, another
for 1992-2001. At a second stage, we produced a uniform classiﬁcation for the whole period.
Each stage is described in detail below.
Oﬃcial conversion tables between 8—10 digit NADI classiﬁcation and 5-digit ISIC
(Revision 2) are available starting from 1980 (when 1000 new categories were added to
the NADI classiﬁcation). Backward compatibility with data from 1974-1979 is also possible,
but at the 5-digit level of aggregation of the NADI classiﬁcation. Starting in 1991, we used
oﬃcial conversion tables between NADI and ISIC Revision 3. Table A2 describes the sources
used in this process.
Given that 5-digit ISIC is a coarser category than the NADI, we created two versions of
each tariﬀ measure. In one, we treated each NADI category as a unique observation (this is
version 1, or v1 below). In the other one, version 2 v2, we kept one instance of each unique
5-digit ISIC/tariﬀ combination, eliminating duplicate entries.
Once we had the 5-digit ISIC code for each NADI category, we aggregated them into
3-digit measures. Starting from the 5-digit classiﬁcation, we computed the median tariﬀ level
18Table A2
NADI-ISIC Conversion
Time Period Internal Classiﬁcation Source for match with ISIC
1974 − 1979 Matched with new 1980
classiﬁcation, based on 5-digit
NADI
M a t c h e dw i t hR e v i s i o n2
Categories with nonzero imports:
Conversion Table published by the
National Statistics Agency (INDEC)
Categories with no imports:
Conversion table produced by Secretaría
de Planeamiento (Secretary of Planning,
Economic Ministry)
1980 − 1991 Data were kept at original
level of disaggregation. (8-
or 10-digit, depending on the
year) (1)
same as 1974 − 1979
1992 − 2001 Harmonized System. Original
level of aggregation (8 digits)
M a t c h e dw i t hR e v i s i o n3
All categories: Conversion Table
provided by Secretaría de Industria
(Secretary of Industry)
Notes: (1) In 1980 and 1981, some tariﬀs are disaggregated at 8 digits, and other at 10. In these cases, the conversion
was done in two stages, starting with the 10 digit categories, and then continuing with the rest.
corresponding to each 4-digit category. To go one step further and obtain the three-digit
tariﬀ measure, we repeated this procedure. The ﬁnal result is therefore the median of the
medians of each subcategory.
The analysis in the main text uses v2 as the starting point for the aggregation procedure.
However, our results do not change much if we use v1 instead. In fact their correlation
coeﬃcient between our tariﬀ measures v1 and v2 is 0.954 at the three digit level. In Figure
A1, we plot the time series of tariﬀs for nine 2-digit categories. It is clear that the series are
quite similar (the correlation is 0.682 at this stage).
We used an intermediate nomenclature built by the World Bank to match the Revision
2 and Revision 3 classiﬁcations. Once again, several categories overlap and we used the
median to take a representative tariﬀ.
As a ﬁnal step, we adjusted the import tariﬀst ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ed i ﬀerential tariﬀ
19levied on imports originating in Mercosur countries (Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Our
source for this exercise is the Commercial Liberalization Program included in the Asunción
Pact (1991). This program established a progressive, automatic and linear reduction in the
tariﬀs assigned to imports from the Mercosur countries.
First, we computed the share of the imports from the Mercosur in the year 1990, prior to
the signing of the agreement. Next, we adjusted the original import tariﬀsc o n s i d e r i n gt h e
estimated ratio and the scales of tariﬀ reduction established by the Asunción pact:
Import Tariﬀit = Intrazone Tariﬀit ∗ Ratio + Original Import Tariﬀit ∗ (1—Ratio),
where i is a 3-digit ISIC code and t is a year.
In order to provide some external consistency check on our tariﬀ series, we compared our
data with some of the indicators provided by Berlinski (1994) and Berlinski (2003). These
are some of the most comprehensive accounts of the history of trade policies in Argentina.
Overall, the numbers on tariﬀ protection reported by Berlinski are quite similar to our
numbers. For example, he reports that the average tariﬀ before the liberalization of the 1970s
was 99 percent (our estimate is around 100 percent). For the 1990s, Berlinski’s estimates of
the average tariﬀ ﬂuctuate around 16-19 percent, and our averages are around 18 percent.
During the 1980s, he reports estimates for 1988, before the reform of the late 1980s and early
1990s, of 48 percent. We instead ﬁnd that the average tariﬀ is close to 30 percent. Even
though there are diﬀerences in methodologies, mostly in aggregating the average tariﬀs, it
is clear that our estimates are pretty consistent with those in Berlinski. It is important to
remark that while Berlinski built tariﬀ measures for selected years, in this paper we need
a full time series of historical trade data. The series produced here are, we believe, an
important contribution of our work.
The Permanent Household Surveys
Data on wages and worker characteristics come from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares
(EPH, Permanent Household Survey). These surveys collect information on household
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21characteristics (size, composition, housing) as well as on individual characteristics like labor
earning, sector of employment, hours worked, education, age, gender, marital status, etc.
The EPH is a repeated cross-section and is usually collected in May and October in each
year. In this paper, we pool individual data from 1974 to 2001. In Table A3, we report the
diﬀerent historical EPH surveys that we use and the sample sizes. For the evolution of the
skill premium, see Figure 2 in the text.
22Table A3
Permanent Household Surveys































Note: Description of Permanent Household
Surveys used in the analysis and eﬀective sample
sizes in each data set.
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25Table 1
The Impacts of Tariﬀso nl o gW a g e s
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log tariﬀ 0.357∗ 0.353∗ 0.355∗ 0.412∗
(0.203) (0.206) (0.205) (0.226)
[0.215] [0.216] [0.216] [0.247]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No No Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets
(clustered by industry and time period).
The regression includes three educational categories. Skilled labor includes college
graduates, semiskilled labor includes workers with secondary school and incomplete
college; unskilled labor includes incomplete secondary or less.
*: Signiﬁcant at 10
Other controls: age, age squared, gender dummy, head dummy, marital status.
26Table 2
Tariﬀ Reform and the Skill Premium
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Tariﬀ 0.355∗ 0.388∗ 0.389∗ 0.447∗
(0.200) (0.211) (0.210) (0.231)
[0.213] [0.224] [0.224] [0.254]
log Tariﬀ*SemiSkilled 0.033 −0.077 −0.076 -0.082
(0.031) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058)
[0.033] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054]
log Tariﬀ*Skilled −0.098 −0.355∗∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.124) (0.123) (0.121)
[0.068] [0.133] [0.131] [0.127]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No No Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets (clustered
by industry and time period).
The regression includes three educational categories. Skilled labor includes college
graduates, semiskilled labor includes workers with secondary school and incomplete college;
unskilled labor includes incomplete secondary or less.
*: Signiﬁcant at 10%
**: Signiﬁcant at 5%
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%
Other controls: age, age squared, gender dummy, head dummy, marital status.
27Table 3
Tariﬀ Reform and the Skill Premium
Sensitivity to The Deﬁnition of Skilled Labor
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Tariﬀ 0.359∗ 0.401∗ 0.402∗ 0.455∗
(0.199) (0.208) (0.207) (0.229)
[0.212] [0.223] [0.222] [0.253]
log Tariﬀ*Skilled −0.002 −0.158∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)
[0.035] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No No Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets
(clustered by industry and time period).
The regression includes two educational categories. Skilled labor includes college and
secondary school graduates, and unskilled labor includes workers with less than complete
secondary school.
*: Signiﬁcant at 10%
**: Signiﬁcant at 5%
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%
Other controls: age, age squared, gender dummy, head dummy, marital status.
28Table 4
Robustness Check
1974-1981 1974-2001 1978-2001 1982-2001
1990-2001
1992-2001
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
log tariﬀ 0.389∗ 0.456∗ 0.595∗ 0.335 0.128∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.248) (0.324) (0.260) (0.054)
[0.224] [0.267] [0.317] [0.257] [0.043]
log tariﬀ*semiskilled −0.076 −0.088 −0.134 −0.127∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.072) (0.094) (0.078) (0.071)
[0.054] [0.072] [0.083] [0.056] [0.049]
log tariﬀ*skilled −0.339∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.148) (0.183) (0.142) (0.165)
[0.131] [0.158] [0.182] [0.142] [0.111]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to schooling
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.35
Observations 29053 24072 21783 21126 11131
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets (clustered by industry and
time period).
The regression includes two educational categories. Skilled labor includes college and secondary school
graduates, and unskilled labor includes workers with less than complete secondary school.
*: Signiﬁcant at 10%
**: Signiﬁcant at 5%
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%
Other controls: age, age squared, gender dummy, head dummy, marital status.
29